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Abstract Affirmative action programs are com-
monly used as a means to level the playing field for
minority- and women-owned firms in public procure-
ment markets, and therefore may be a positive factor
in business entry and survival. To the extent that
affirmative action programs also apply to traditional
labor markets, however, they may alter the opportu-
nity cost of starting a business. We utilize the
elimination of affirmative action in California and
Washington States through voter initiatives to iden-
tify the effect of affirmative action on minority and
female self-employment rates. In our base specifica-
tions, we find evidence of modest increases in self-
employment among minorities and women in both
California and Washington after elimination of
affirmative action, consistent with the hypothesis that
the opportunity cost of starting a business fell due to
restricting opportunities in the traditional labor mar-
kets. The sign of the estimated effect, however, is not
uniformly positive when considering specific race/
gender groups, and the statistical significance of the
main results is somewhat sensitive to the choice of
control states.
Keywords Affirmative action  Self-employment 
Minorities
JEL Classifications J15  J16  L26
1 Introduction
Affirmative action programs are widely used in
federal public procurement markets and by many
states and local governments, and contracts awarded
through these programs are a significant source of
revenue for some firms owned by minorities and
women. Many of the existing federal, state, and local
government programs were created in the late 1970s
and 1980s to develop minority and women enterprise,
counter the effects of past discrimination, and reduce
unemployment among minorities in urban communi-
ties.1 For the past two decades, however, state and
local programs have been both judicially and legis-
latively challenged and in many cases dismantled
(e.g., Croson 1989). Recent ballot initiatives in
California and Washington have significantly cur-
tailed the use of affirmative action in these states, and
similar initiatives are under consideration in other
states as well. Understanding the impact of affirmative
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action policies is therefore of considerable importance
in the current policy debate.
In this paper, we estimate how business ownership
rates of minorities and women changed in the wake
of the elimination of affirmative action programs in
California and Washington States. We use the natural
experiment created by voter initiatives in California
and Washington that eliminated the use of race or
gender as criteria in public employment and con-
tracting. The rates of minority business ownership
before and after elimination of the programs in
California and Washington are compared. To control
for time-varying factors affecting business ownership
in California and Washington and for minorities and
women in the USA, we employ a triple-difference
(DDD) estimator, which compares the self-employ-
ment rate of minorities and women relative to White
men in treatment versus nontreatment states before
and after eliminating affirmative action.
There are two primary mechanisms through which
affirmative action can affect the business ownership
rate. First, affirmative action in procurement can lead
to greater profits for incumbent and potential entrant
disadvantaged business enterprises (DBEs) if it
increases public purchases of goods and services from
minority- and women-owned firms. The greater profits
increase the likelihood of entry by potential entrants
and reduce the likelihood of exit on the part of
incumbent DBEs. This can occur either from encour-
aging the utilization of DBEs that are as productive as
their White male counterparts but are not getting
opportunities due to discrimination or network limi-
tations,2 or by creating opportunities for DBEs that are
not yet as cost effective. Prime contractors are often
required to allot a specified percentage of the total
amount of government contracts to minority-owned
subcontractors and suppliers (Rice 1991; Myers 1997).
Second, if affirmative action programs affect both
employment and procurement, then elimination of
these programs can potentially have the counterintu-
itive effect of increasing the self-employment rate
among minorities and women. This is because limited
or reduced labor market opportunities are found to
lead to entry into self-employment (see Krashinsky
2005 and Parker 2004, for example).
In a paper with important implications for our
study, Myers (2007) examines the effects of eliminat-
ing affirmative action in California due to Proposition
209 on employment, unemployment, nonparticipa-
tion, and the wages of minority workers. This study
finds significant reductions in the employment rate of
minority and female workers in California after the
elimination of affirmative action, and corresponding
increases in unemployment and nonparticipation.
Eliminating affirmative action therefore may limit
employment opportunities along with procurement
opportunities. While Myers documents a transition out
of employment and into unemployment and nonpar-
ticipation, our study will document a missing piece of
the puzzle: whether the state of self-employment
became more or less common, and as a consequence
whether it ameliorated or contributed to the rising
unemployment and nonparticipation of minorities and
women.
Prior to Proposition 209 in California and Initia-
tive 200 (I-200) in Washington State, affirmative
action applied broadly to public contracting, employ-
ment, and college admissions. Affirmative action was
a common feature of the allocation of public
contracts at all levels of government in both states,
though how it was implemented varied somewhat by
state agency and locale. A common approach was to
require state contractors to subcontract a portion of
their contracts to disadvantaged business enterprises.
California set a goal for the annual participation of
minority- and women-owned firms in state contracts.
Washington did not set a statewide goal, though the
use of affirmative action was commonplace in state
agencies; for instance, the Department of Transpor-
tation set a goal for participation of minority- and
women-owned firms in highway construction con-
tracts. Both California and Washington took affirma-
tive action in state hiring.3
2 For evidence on blocked access to business networks, such as
in construction, see Bates (1993), Feagin and Imani (1994), and
Bates and Howell (1997).
3 See Myers (2007) for a description of California’s affirma-
tive action programs in hiring. In Washington, the state
identified protected groups based on the gap between state
public employment of that group and their representation in the
labor force. One significant program utilized to increase
employment from these groups was a ‘‘plus three’’ program.
If none of the top scoring seven applicants for a position were
from a protected group, the three top scoring protected group
applicants were added to the pool of final candidates.
According to the Seattle Times, ‘‘plus three’’ hires accounted
for 7% of Washington state employees.
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California’s Proposition 209 was passed by voters
in 1996 and withstood a series of legal challenges in
1997. Many state agencies continued to use race- and
gender-conscious methods in the awarding of state
contracts, however, until Governor Wilson’s execu-
tive order in March 1998 requiring the cessation of
their use.4 Washington’s Initiative 200 was passed by
the voters towards the end of 1998 and was imple-
mented in January 1999.
Some of our findings indicate that self-employ-
ment rates among minorities and women were
generally higher following elimination of affirmative
action, consistent with the idea that minorities and
women may turn to self-employment in response to
the reduced employment opportunities documented in
Myers (2007). This finding is robust to different
definitions of self-employment, restricting the age of
the sample, and removing from the sample the years
immediately surrounding the policy changes. While
in general our results indicate that self-employment
rates rose following elimination of affirmative action,
this was not uniformly true across all race and gender
groups; for example, minority men in Washington
experienced declines in self-employment. It is also
worth noting that, while qualitatively similar, restrict-
ing the sample of control group states to those with
minority compositions similar to California and
Washington leads to estimated effects that are no
longer statistically significant for the main
specification.
One concern with empirical studies using law
changes as natural experiments is that a law change
may be chosen endogenously with respect to the
outcome of interest. In this case, affirmative action
laws may be abolished when they are no longer
needed to support the self-employment of minorities
or women because levels are perceived to be
sufficiently high. This seems unlikely to be a concern
for our study. First, the lag between the conception of
a ballot initiative and eventual implementation is
potentially several years. Second, the initiatives
considered in our study were broad in scope. In
particular, a primary focus of the initiatives taken up
in California and Washington was on education,
which is unlikely to be viewed by voters as closely
related to trends in minority and female business
ownership.
The self-employment of minorities and women is
of considerable interest since self-employment tradi-
tionally has been one route of advancement for
disadvantaged groups.5 Minority firms are more
likely to hire minorities, and it has been argued that
promoting minority business growth may be a more
effective method of reducing minority unemployment
than overall economic and employment growth
(Bates 1993; Boston 1999, 2006; US Census Bureau
1997). Minorities and women are often found to face
discrimination in credit markets, which will tend to
limit business formation among these individuals
even when the return of the business exceeds the
market borrowing rate (Blanchflower et al. 2003;
Cavalluzzo et al. 2002). Low levels of personal
wealth and liquidity constraints may also limit
opportunities to start and operate successful minority
businesses (Bates 1997; Fairlie 1999; Fairlie and
Robb 2007, 2008).6
Furthermore, the opportunities for traditional
employment may be more limited for minorities
and women due to residential segregation, discrim-
ination, and limited networks of employed friends
and relatives. Self-employment is the primary alter-
native to the traditional labor market, and affirmative
action may play an important role in creating
business opportunities. Thus, racial disparities in
business ownership may translate into broader
income and wealth inequality (Bradford 2003). At
the same time, racial disparities in business owner-
ship may be exacerbated by the possibility that
unprepared persons try their hand at self-employment
in response to limited opportunity in the traditional
labor market.
Billions of contract dollars are awarded annually
to minority and women firms through affirmative
4 For instance, the California Department of Transportation
continued to set requirements for participation of minority- and
women-owned subcontractors in projects using state funds
(Marion 2009). We use 1998 as the date of implementation of
Proposition 209 in the analysis.
5 We use the terms ‘‘self-employment’’ and ‘‘business own-
ership’’ synonymously in this paper. This follows the conven-
tion of the US Census Bureau in defining self-employment as
being ‘‘self-employed in own not incorporated or incorporated
business, professional practice, or farm.’’
6 Racial disparities in business ownership do not appear to be
due to differences in preferences, because African-Americans
are found to be almost twice as likely as White Americans to
attempt starting a business (Koellinger and Minniti 2006).
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action programs, and these programs are in some
forms controversial both politically and judicially.7
However, relatively little is known about their
effectiveness, and the sparse existing evidence is
decidedly mixed. Myers and Chan (1996) examine
New Jersey state procurement contracts, finding that
the implementation of set-asides was unsuccessful at
closing the award gap between minority and nonmi-
nority firms, while Marion (forthcoming) finds that
affirmative action in the highway construction indus-
try is successful at raising the utilization of minority-
owned firms while impacting little the utilization of
women-owned firms. In addition, these programs
may raise the cost of public procurement (Marion
2009). The literature is also mixed regarding the
success of these programs in increasing minority
entrepreneurship. While Chatterji et al. (2009) find
positive effects of affirmative action on rates of
minority entrepreneurship, Blanchflower and Wain-
wright (2005) find little impact of affirmative action
on minority entrepreneurship, though business own-
ership rates among White women may be positively
impacted. Bates and Williams (1996) find that
affirmative action programs may lead minority-
owned firms to overextend themselves, leading to
lower business success, yet Bates and Williams
(1993) find that Black-owned businesses located in
cities with Black mayors are more successful than
those located in other cities.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In
Sect. 2, we describe the data we use. In Sect. 3, we
discuss the statistical methods used to identify the
effect of affirmative action, and in Sect. 4 we present
the results regarding self-employment rates. Sec-
tion 5 concludes.
2 Data
We use data from the 1990 to 2006 Current
Population Survey (CPS) Outgoing Rotation Group
(ORG) files. These surveys, conducted annually by
the US Bureau of the Census and the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, are representative of the entire US popu-
lation. The ORG files contain annual samples that are
roughly three times larger than those from a monthly
CPS, such as the commonly used March Annual
Demographic Files. The CPS is the only dataset large
enough to allow for examining trends in self-
employment for minority groups at the state level.
Combining the 1990–2006 CPS data we have obser-
vations for more than 4 million individuals.8
Self-employed workers are defined as those indi-
viduals who identify themselves on the class-of-
worker question as self-employed in their own not
incorporated or incorporated business.9 The owner-
ship of both nonemployer and employer firms is
captured. The class-of-worker question refers to the
job at which the respondent worked the most hours
during the reference week. As a result, one potential
concern with this measure of self-employment is that
some respondents may be simultaneously both self-
employed and employed in the traditional labor
market. If an individual with such simultaneous
employment suffers a sufficient drop in hours in their
traditional job, her class of work could switch to self-
employment. Therefore, any factor that lowers tradi-
tional employment could lead to an increase in the
measured self-employment rate, even with no change
in the actual rate of self-employment. In our paper,
we consider a change in affirmative action policy that
alters the returns to both self-employment and
traditional employment, so it is possible for this type
of mismeasurement to bias either up or down the
estimated effect of affirmative action in our design.
However, this can only significantly bias our results if
self-employment as secondary employment is com-
mon, which is not the case (Headd 2005).
7 For instance, the Small Business Administration reports that,
in 2008, US $28.2 billion of federal procurement contracts was
awarded to DBEs, 6.3% of the value of total federal
procurement contracts awarded. At least 20 states have
implemented affirmative action in contracting, in addition to
numerous local governments (Insight Center for Community
Economic Development 2007).
8 We do not examine transitions into and out of self-
employment using matched annual CPS data because of the
resulting reduction in sample size. Match rates for the ORG
files range from 55% to 60%, and matching is problematic or
impossible with the 1993, 1994, and 1995 waves. Also,
conditioning on self-employment in the first survey year, which
is necessary for estimating exit rates, results in a further
reduction in sample size of roughly 90%. Finally, the effects of
eliminating affirmative action are likely to work in same
direction on entry and survival, which determine the self-
employment rate, suggesting that the effect on the self-
employment rate represents a good summary measure.
9 Unpaid family workers are not counted as self-employed.
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We restrict the sample to include only individuals
aged 20–64 years to lessen concerns regarding
retirement decisions. Unlike business-level datasets,
the individual-level CPS includes information on
non-business-owners, allowing us to directly measure
business ownership rates. The CPS also includes
detailed demographic and geographic information
that is used to control for the determinants of business
ownership.
The triple-difference approach we take to examine
the effect of eliminating affirmative action on this
measure of self-employment status requires classify-
ing individuals along three dimensions. First, we are
interested in comparing outcomes for minorities and
women with those of White men. We therefore
classify individuals along eight race/gender catego-
ries: White, Black, Latino, and other minority men;
and White, Black, Latino, and other minority women.
The ‘‘other’’ minority category includes Asian/Pacific
Islander, Native American, and other races. We also
classify individuals by state of residence to separately
compare the treated states, California and Washing-
ton, with similar control states that did not change
affirmative action policy. Finally, we classify obser-
vations into the pre-affirmative-action period and the
post-affirmative-action period.
3 Methods
We are interested in estimating how eliminating
affirmative action altered the self-employment rate of
the treated group, minorities and women in California
and Washington States. To investigate this question,
we estimate a linear probability model of self-
employment at the individual level. Although we
control for measurable differences, unobservable
factors could alter the self-employment decision over
time, across states, and for minorities and women; for
instance, shifts in demand or effective state business
taxes could alter the self-employment rate in Cali-
fornia over time. If this is correlated with the end of
affirmative action, merely examining the change in
self-employment for minorities and women will yield
biased estimates of the effect of affirmative action.
To account for these unobserved factors that shift
self-employment, we will employ the commonly used
triple-difference (DDD) specification similar to that
used by Myers (2007).10 Such a specification controls
for year effects, state effects, and minority/women
effects, as well as state-specific time effects, minor-
ity/women-specific time effects, and minority/
women-specific state effects. The basic equation
estimated for the self-employment probability is the
following:
Yist ¼ c0 þ c1ICA þ c2P98 þ c3D þ c4ICA  P98 þ c5D
 ICA þ c6D  P98 þ c7D  ICA  P98 þ eist;
ð1Þ
where D is an indicator for a minority or female
individual, P98 indicates post 1998, and ICA = 1 if the
individual lives in California. There are also similar
terms for Washington, which have been suppressed
here for convenience. The coefficient of interest is c7.
It captures the change in the gap between minority/
female and White self-employment in California
relative to the rest of the USA. In other words, given
how self-employment changed for minorities and
women relative to White men in the rest of the USA,
and given the change in self-employment for White
males in California, did the self-employment rate for
minorities and women change by more or less than
expected?
We also extend the basic specification shown in
(1) in several dimensions. First, we include a full set
of state effects, as, year effects kt, and vector of
individual controls, Xist, which include age, educa-
tion, marital status, and urban status:
Yist ¼ as þ kt þ c3D þ c4ICA  P98 þ c5D  ICA
þ c6D  P98 þ c7D  ICA  P98 þ b0Xist þ eist:
ð2Þ
To allow for a richer set of controls for national
trends in minority entrepreneurship, we also allow the
year fixed effects, kt, to depend on race.
Our basic estimates combine minorities and
women into one treatment group, though it is possible
that the effect of affirmative action differs across
racial/gender groups. Therefore, we will also estimate
specifications that allow the coefficient c7 to differ
10 In the entrepreneurship literature, examples of studies using
similar natural experiments include Fossen and Steiner (2009),
who employ the DDD approach, and Oosterbeek et al. (2010),
who use a difference-in-difference strategy. See Meyer (1995)
for a detailed discussion of the natural experiment approach in
the general setting.
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across specific race/gender groups in California and
Washington. We also recognize that factors influenc-
ing the self-employment decision are likely to differ
in particular for men versus women. We therefore
also estimate specifications (1) and (2) restricting the
sample to men.
The basic identifying assumption, common to all
DDD specifications, is that there were no state-
specific shocks specifically affecting minority and
female self-employment in California and Washing-
ton aside from the change in affirmative action
policy. One way this assumption might be violated is
if there exist pre-existing trends in minority business
ownership specific to California and Washington. If
business ownership rates among minorities and
women were trending upward in California and
Washington prior to elimination of affirmative action,
then our estimate of c7 is likely to be biased upward.
To address this concern, we estimate a specification
that allows for separate race-specific year effects for
California and Washington.
A second assumption of the model is that the
trends in the self-employment rates of minorities and
women in the rest of the USA represent what would
have happened in California and Washington had
affirmative action not been eliminated. This allows
for a causal interpretation of the estimated coefficient
c7. If affirmative action policies were changed in
other states at the same time as in California and
Washington, then our estimates of the effect of
ending affirmative action will be biased, since a
portion of the control group would receive the
treatment of a change in affirmative action policy.
According to a recent, thorough survey of affirmative
action policies (Insight Center for Community Eco-
nomic Development 2007) there was very little
change in state affirmative action policies in the
timeframe immediately surrounding the elimination
of affirmative action in California and Washington.
Affirmative action was used by 22 states to increase
purchases from minority- and women-owned firms,
15 of which used contracting goals. In addition to
California and Washington, this study identified only
four other significant changes in state affirmative
action programs. Ohio eliminated affirmative action
in contracting in 1998, but almost immediately
reinstated much of the program the following year.
In 2000, Florida eliminated affirmative action goals
in the award of state contracts, but replaced it with an
apparently successful diversity program. The only
other two major changes in state-level affirmative
action programs occurred in Louisiana in 1996 and
Oklahoma in 2001, both of which eliminated consid-
eration of race and gender in the awarding of state
contracts. These changes occurred in states repre-
senting only a very small portion of our control
group, and furthermore in years not coinciding with
the policy changes under consideration.
3.1 Comparison group states
The choice of comparison group states included in
the sample is important because the included states
identify the national trends in minority business
ownership rates. We estimate the model with two sets
of control states. First, we estimate the model
including all states, and in so doing compare trends
in California and Washington relative to the rest of
the USA. Second, we define a more refined control
group by identifying states that have similar minority
compositions as California and Washington. We
choose the 15 states closest in minority population
shares to California and Washington, which are
reported in Appendix 1.
4 Results
4.1 Basic triple-difference results
We begin by presenting mean self-employment rates
for women and minority men in California and
Washington before and after elimination of affirma-
tive action in Tables 1, 2, and 3, where the self-
employment rate is defined as the percentage of
population aged 20–64 years that is a self-employed
business owner. From these means, we form the DDD
estimates that represent the primary results of the
paper. The sample runs from 1990 through 2006, and
thus includes 8 years before and 9 years after elim-
ination of affirmative action for California and
9 prechange years for Washington. We present the
results separately for three definitions of the treat-
ment group. In Table 1, we begin by grouping all
women and minorities into the treatment group. In
Tables 2 and 3, we present the results separately for
minority men and all women, respectively.
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While these estimates are not regression adjusted
for other covariates, they serve several purposes.
Presenting the mean self-employment rates facilitates
evaluating the magnitude of the estimated effects.
Also, it describes some basic trends in the self-
employment gap between White men and minorities/
women, as well as serving to illustrate the identifi-
cation strategy used in the paper.
In panel A of Table 1, we present the results for
California for the combined treatment group. Self-
employment rates for minorities and women in
California are 6.8% pre affirmative action, well
below the 16.7% rate for White men. This represents
a 10.1 percentage point gap in the self-employment
rate in the years 1990–1997. After the elimination of
affirmative action, this gap falls by 1.9 percentage
points. The decline in the gap resulted from a small
increase in the self-employment rate of minorities
and women and a far more substantial fall in the self-
employment rate of White men. The White male rate
fell from 17.0% to 15.2%.
A similar pattern played out in the rest of the USA
as well. Self-employment of minorities and women
increased by a modest amount (and was essentially
unchanged), and the self-employment rate of White
men fell noticeably (from 13.5% to 12.3%). Like in
California, the gap between the self-employment rate
of White men and that of minorities and women fell in
the pre-1998 period to the post-1998 period in the rest
of the USA as well, however it narrowed at a slower
rate. Taken together, the self-employment rate grew
0.65 percentage points faster for minority men and
women in California than for minorities and women in
the rest of the USA. This represents an increase of less
than 10% in the self-employment rate.
Panel B of Table 1 presents similar estimates for
Washington. While the White male self-employment
rate in California is noticeably higher than that for the
USA, the self-employment rate of working-age White
men in Washington closely resembled that for the rest
of the USA prior to Washington’s elimination of
affirmative action in 1999. The gap between White
self-employment and minority/female self-employ-
ment is correspondingly much lower in Washington
than in California. The gap is 6.1 percentage points pre
1999 and is actually narrower than the 8.0 percentage
Table 1 Business ownership trends in states eliminating affirmative action versus rest of US women and minority men versus White
men: Current Population Survey (1990–2006)
Before 1998 After 1998 Before 1999 After 1999
Panel A: California versus rest of USA (except WA) Panel B: Washington versus rest of USA (except CA)
California Washington
White men 0.1695 0.1520 White men 0.1324 0.1135














White men 0.1345 0.1233 White men 0.1339 0.1226

















The sample includes all individuals aged 20–64 years
US estimates exclude California and Washington
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Table 2 Business ownership trends in states eliminating affirmative action versus rest of US minority men versus White men: CPS
(1990–2006)
Before 1998 After 1998 Before 1999 After 1999
Panel A: California versus rest of USA (except WA) Panel B: Washington versus rest of USA (except CA)
California Washington
White men 0.1695 0.1520 White men 0.1324 0.1135














White men 0.1345 0.1233 White men 0.1339 0.1226

















The sample includes all individuals aged 20–64 years
US estimates exclude California and Washington
Table 3 Business ownership trends in states eliminating affirmative action versus rest of US women versus White men: CPS
(1990–2006)
Before 1998 After 1998 Before 1999 After 1999
Panel A: California versus rest of USA (except WA) Panel B: Washington versus rest of USA (except CA)
California Washington
White men 0.1695 0.1520 White men 0.1324 0.1135














White men 0.1345 0.1233 White men 0.1339 0.1226

















The sample includes all individuals aged 20–64 years
US estimates exclude California and Washington
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point gap in the USA. The Washington gap shrinks
further in the post-affirmative-action period to 4.5
percentage points, faster than the 1.2 percentage point
decline in the rest of the USA. The effect of eliminating
affirmative action on the self-employment rate of
minorities and women in Washington is therefore
estimated to be 0.4 percentage points.
The results shown in Table 1 present a similar
narrative for California and Washington. Both of
these states experienced a decline in self-employment
in the post-affirmative-action period relative to the
rest of the USA. The decline in self-employment
among minorities and women was smaller. This may
be due to the positive effects of eliminating affirma-
tive action on self-employment outweighing the
negative effects.
We next divide the treatment group between men
and women. This is potentially instructive if men and
women are affected differentially by affirmative
action. The results considering the change in self-
employment rates for minority men relative to White
men are shown in Table 2, while the results for
women relative to White men are shown in Table 3.
For California, the results are similar for women and
treated men. Self-employment rates rose in the post-
affirmative-action period by 0.46 percentage points
for minority men relative to White men in California
relative to the rest of the USA. For women, self-
employment rates rose by 0.67 percentage points
relative to White women in California relative to the
rest of the USA.
The story is somewhat different in Washington.
Panel B of Table 2 shows the results of comparing
minority men specifically with White men. This
treatment group displays falling self-employment
rates relative to White men after affirmative action,
in Washington relative to the rest of the USA. The
estimated effect of eliminating affirmative action on
the self-employment rates of women in Washington
is positive, similar to the effect for women in
California. One drawback to this basic DDD spec-
ification is that it does not allow for different time
trends in self-employment for minorities and
women. In the following sections, we build on the
preceding results using regression analysis, which
will allow us to better control for such possible
confounding factors. This will turn out to account
for the differing effects for minority men in
Washington.
4.2 Regression results from full sample of states
In Table 4 we present the results of estimating Eqs. 1
and 2 for the full sample of states. In column (1), the
estimates of c7 are presented for California and
Washington without detailed controls. Because this is
virtually equivalent to the exercise shown in
Tables 1, 2, and 3, we do not discuss these results
in detail. The estimates indicate that minority/female
self-employment rates were slightly higher in Cali-
fornia and Washington post affirmative action. In the
specifications shown in subsequent columns, we
gradually add demographic controls, state and year
fixed effects, race/gender-specific year effects, and
race/gender-specific time trends for California and
Washington. We estimate all specifications using
ordinary least squares (OLS) and report robust
standard errors that adjust for clustering at the state
level. Marginal effect estimates are similar for probit
and logit models.
In the specification shown in column (2), we add
demographic controls, state fixed effects, and year
effects, and in the specification displayed in column (3)
we further add race/gender year effects. Appendix 2
reports means for the demographic controls. These
additional controls have little effect on the estimated
coefficients. For both California and Washington, the
effect of eliminating affirmative action is estimated to
be of the same sign and virtually the same magnitude as
the specification without controls shown in column (1).
One concern with a triple-difference estimator is
that there might exist a preexisting trend specific to
the treatment group. To address this concern, we
estimate a specification including California and
Washington time trends that are allowed to differ
for minority and women versus White men.11 These
state- and race-specific time trends are meant to
capture pre-existing trends affecting minorities and
women in the treatment states. Without these con-
trols, the presence of unobserved factors that influ-
ence self-employment over time specifically for
11 Specifically, we introduce terms into the specification
described by Eq. 2 capturing linear state-specific time trends
for California and Washington, t*ICA and t*IWA, and linear
time trends specific to the treatment group in those states,
t*ICA*D and t*IWA*D. The linear time trend is not included on
its own since we estimate year effects.
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minorities living in California or Washington will
lead to biased estimates of the DDD coefficient. For
instance, if the self-employment rate for Blacks in
California was rising prior to the implementation of
Proposition 209, one would worry that the self-
employment rate would have continued to rise even
without the elimination of affirmative action, and we
would mistakenly attribute that increase to Proposi-
tion 209. We display the results of this estimation in
column (4). While the estimates of c7 are somewhat
larger in this specification, including these time
trends does not qualitatively change the results.
Relative self-employment rates rose for minorities
and women after eliminating affirmative action in
California and Washington.
4.2.1 Additional estimates
We estimate a few additional specifications to check
the robustness of these results. Appendix 3 reports
estimates. First, we examine whether the estimates
are sensitive to including years around the initiatives.
There might be anticipation effects and implementa-
tion delays that could create ambiguity over when
affirmative action ended. We exclude the initiative
years 1998 and 1999 to examine this question
(specification 1). We find that the estimates do not
differ substantially when these are excluded. Second,
we are concerned about including years that are either
much earlier or much later than the initiatives. We
limit the sample period to 1992–2004 to address this
concern (specification 2). We find that focusing in on
the initiative dates also does not change the main
results. Finally, we limit the sample to ages
20–54 years (specification 3). We are concerned that
individuals close to retirement age may behave
differently. The results do not change substantially.
Overall, the estimates are not overly sensitive to
alternative time periods and age groups.
4.3 Minority male estimates
The decision to enter self-employment is likely to
differ significantly between men and women, and
affirmative action may differentially affect men and
women. Men and women differ in the types of
businesses they start and in the labor market oppor-
tunities that they face (US Census Bureau 2006).
They also are likely to differ in their elasticity with
respect to changes in business or employment
opportunities. In Table 5, we display estimates of a
model that considers only the male self-employment
rate. In this case, we compare minority men to White
men. Interestingly, the focus on men somewhat
Table 4 Linear probability regressions for business ownership: US sample [CPS (1990–2006)]

















Demographic controls No Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Race/gender year fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Race/gender CA and WA time trends No No No Yes
Mean of dependent variable 0.089043 0.089043 0.089043 0.089043
Sample size 4,267,176 4,267,176 4,267,176 4,267,176
Displayed are triple-difference coefficients representing the change in the self-employment rate after elimination of affirmative action
for minorities and women, represented by the treatment variable D, relative to White males in the treatment state versus the rest of the
USA
The sample consists of individuals (aged 20–64 years)
Demographic controls include age, education, marital status, and urban status
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the state level
328 R. Fairlie, J. Marion
123
changes the conclusions regarding the effect of
affirmative action. We see that the estimated effect
of ending affirmative action is much smaller for men
than was estimated for the sample as a whole. In
California, once covariates, state effects, and year
effects are added to the model, the triple-difference
coefficient is very small and statistically insignificant
[see column (3)]. Only upon inclusion of minority
time trends specific to California does the estimated
coefficient become statistically significant, and it is
still slightly smaller than that estimated using the
entire sample. While the estimated effect of ending
affirmative action is estimated to be merely smaller
for men in California, we estimate that in Washington
the effect of ending affirmative action actually has a
negative impact on the self-employment rate of
minority men. We find that the self-employment rate
of minority men in Washington fell between 0.3 and
0.5 percentage points, depending on the included
controls, relative to White men in Washington, as
compared with the rest of the USA.
4.4 Alternative definitions for self-employment
The previous subsections examine the self-employ-
ment rates of minorities and women, categorizing as
self-employed those who listed self-employment as
their primary occupation in the CPS. We do not
impose restrictions on working. One criticism of this
measure is that it may overstate true self-employment
if some individuals who are in fact unemployed list
self-employment as their occupation. To address this,
we restrict our definition of self-employment to
include only those individuals reporting themselves
as self-employed who worked a significant number of
hours. We will first consider self-employed only
those individuals working at least 15 h in the past
week, and in a second robustness check we will
categorize only those working more than 30 h
worked as self-employed.
The results are presented in Table 6. In column
(1), we reproduce the estimates from the specification
including the full set of controls as shown in the last
column of Table 4. In column (2), we present the
results where only those with greater than 15 h
worked in the past survey week are counted as self-
employed. We see that the results are qualitatively
similar between the two specifications. The estimated
coefficients are also generally of similar magnitude as
in the base specification using the broader measure of
self-employment. Column (3) presents the results of
further narrowing the definition of self-employment
to those reporting working 30 or more hours of work
in the past week. Again, the results are similar to
Table 5 Linear probability regressions for business ownership: only men [CPS (1990–2006)]

















Demographic controls No Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Minority/female year fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Minority/female CA and WA time trends No No No Yes
Mean of dependent variable 0.1225 0.1225 0.1225 0.1225
Sample size 2,045,890 2,045,890 2,045,890 2,045,890
Displayed are triple-difference coefficients representing the change in the self-employment rate after the elimination of affirmative
action for minority men, represented by the treatment variable D, relative to White males in the treatment state versus the rest of the
USA
The sample consists of individuals (aged 20–64 years)
Demographic controls include age, education, marital status, and urban status
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the state level
Affirmative action programs and business ownership 329
123
those using the broader self-employment measure.
Our main results are thus not sensitive to the
definition of self-employment used.
4.5 By race/gender group
We next examine how elimination of affirmative
action affected the self-employment rates of specific
race/gender groups. In Table 7 we present the results
of estimating Eqs. 1 and 2 for the full sample of
states, where c7 is allowed to vary for each race and
gender. The previous results combine all groups,
which may mask heterogeneity in the response of
self-employment across race/gender groups. How-
ever, by disaggregating into relatively narrow treat-
ment groups, we may become subject to the multiple
inference problem.
In column (1), we present basic results with no
demographic controls. In California, we find statis-
tically significant increases in self-employment post
1998 for White women, Latino men and women,
other minority men and women, and Black women.
We estimate a statistically significant decline for
Black men. For Washington, we estimate statistically
significant increases in the self-employment rate post
1999 for Black and Latino men, and White, Black,
and Latino women. We also find a statistically
significant decline in self-employment among other
minority men, and a statistically insignificant change
in the self-employment rate of other minority women.
In the specification shown in column (2), we add
demographic controls, state fixed effects, and year
effects, and in the specification displayed in column
(3) we further add race/gender year effects. These
additional controls have little effect on the estimated
coefficients. For each race/gender group in both
California and Washington, the effect of eliminating
affirmative action is estimated to be of the same sign
and virtually the same magnitude as the specification
without controls shown in column (1).
In column (4), we present estimates of a similar
specification including time trends that are allowed to
vary for each race and gender category separately for
California and Washington. Including these controls
does not change the results for most race and gender
groups, though the estimates are larger in many cases.
Table 6 Linear probability regressions for business ownership with alternative self-employment definitions: CPS (1990–2006)
(1) (2) (3)













Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Race/gender year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Race/gender CA and WA time trends Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dependent variable 0.0890 0.0781 0.0684
Sample size 4,267,176 4,267,176 4,267,176
Displayed are triple-difference coefficients representing the change in the self-employment rate after the elimination of affirmative
action for minorities and women, represented by the treatment variable D, relative to White males in the treatment state versus the
rest of the USA
The sample consists of individuals (aged 20–64 years)
Demographic controls include age, education, marital status, and urban status
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the state level
In the main specification, an individual is listed as self-employed if this was his or her primary form of employment. Two alternative
definitions for self-employment are considered. In column (2), the definition of self-employment is restricted to those with self-
employment as their primary form of employment, and who worked at least 15 h in this primary job. In column (3), we increase this
restriction to 30 h
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Importantly, the inclusion of race- and state-specific
time trends has a noticeable effect on the DDD
estimates for Black men in both California and
Washington. As the prior results showed, self-
employment among Black men was lower after
affirmative action in California. However, relative
to their trend, Black men in California are estimated
to be 0.8 percentage points more likely to be self-
employed post Proposition 209. This implies that the
self-employment rate of Black men in California was
Table 7 Linear probability regressions for business ownership with detailed race/gender groups: US sample [CPS (1990–2006)]
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
















































































































Demographic controls No Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Race/gender year fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Race/gender CA and WA time trends No No No Yes
Mean of dependent variable 0.08904 0.08904 0.08904 0.08904
Sample size 4,267,176 4,267,176 4,267,176 4,267,176
Displayed are triple-difference coefficients representing the change in the self-employment rate after the elimination affirmative
action for the stated minority group relative to White males in the treatment state versus the rest of the USA
The sample consists of individuals (aged 20–64 years)
Demographic controls include age, education, marital status, and urban status
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trending downward even prior to the elimination of
affirmative action. The opposite conclusion can be
drawn for Black men in Washington. Adding the
race- and Washington-specific time trend turns the
coefficient for Black men from strongly positive to
statistically indistinguishable from zero, indicating
that self-employment among Blacks in Washington
was trending upward prior to Initiative 200.
4.6 Restricting the comparison group states
The estimates reported above indicate that the
likelihood of self-employment for minorities and
women was higher in California and Washington than
it would have been had these states kept affirmative
action. The estimation strategy leading to this con-
clusion assumes that the change in self-employment
rates for minorities and women relative to White men
in California and Washington would mimic the
change observed in the rest of the USA had
affirmative action not been eliminated. Individuals
in other states are treated as a counterfactual for
individuals in California and Washington. However,
the pattern observed in other states may not always
provide an accurate counterfactual, as some states
differ dramatically from California and Washington.
The racial composition of a state’s population is one
characteristic likely to affect outcomes for minority-
and women-owned firms. In this section, we use only
states with similar demographic characteristics to
California and Washington, where we select compar-
ison states based on the minority share of the popula-
tion. This comparison group may provide a more
accurate representation of how the likelihood of self-
employment would have changed had California and
Washington kept affirmative action.
4.6.1 California comparison group
We begin by restricting the sample of states to
California and the 15 states whose minority popula-
tion share is closest to that of California (see
Appendix 1). We present the results of estimating
Eqs. 1 and 2 for this sample in Table 8. For the first
three specifications, restricting the sample in this
manner does not have a large impact on the results.
We still see a modest increase in the self-employment
rate for minorities and women relative to White men
in California versus the comparison group of other
states. These results are robust to the inclusion of
state effects, year effects, demographic controls, and
race/gender year effects, which we include in the
specifications shown in columns (2) and (3). The
estimates, however, become much smaller when we
include a minority/female time trend specific to
California [column (4)]. In this specification, the
coefficient estimate is very small and statistically
insignificant. When focusing on this alternative
control group of states, we do not find evidence in
this specification of an increase in minority/female
self-employment after eliminating affirmative action.
4.6.2 Washington comparison group
We next perform a similar exercise of identifying a
more demographically similar set of control states for
Washington State. In Table 9 we present the results
from restricting the sample to Washington and the 15
states most closely matching its minority population
share. Unlike the specification using the full sample of
states, the estimates in columns (1)–(3) indicate a
negative effect of eliminating affirmative action.
However, this seems to be due to pre-existing trends.
Once a Washington-specific time trend for minorities
and women is included, the estimated DDD coefficient
is positive, although relatively small and statistically
insignificant at conventional levels (p-value of 0.10).
Using the more restricted sample of comparison states
and controlling for specific time trends results in a
much smaller estimate of the effect of removing
affirmative action on self-employment in Washington.
This result is similar to what we find for California.
4.6.3 Race/gender-specific estimates
In Tables 10 and 11, we examine how elimination of
affirmative action affected the self-employment rates
of specific race/gender groups using the more
narrowly defined sets of comparison states. For
California, we find statistically significant increases
in self-employment post 1998 for Black women and
Latino women (Table 10). The coefficient estimates
for Black men, Latino men, and White women are all
very small and close to zero in specification 4, which
includes race- and state-specific time trends. These
results differ from the main estimates in which
several groups showed positive effects, including
Black men, Latino men, and White women in
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California. These results also indicate that the lack of
finding a significant positive effect for all groups
combined is due to the lack of significance for most
individual race/gender groups.
For Washington, we estimate statistically signifi-
cant increases in the self-employment rate post 1999
for White women, Black women, and Latino women
when focusing on specification 4. We find negative
and significant decreases for Black men and other
minority men. The estimates for specific racial/
gender groups generally follow the same pattern as
found when using the full US sample as the
comparison group.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, the self-employment response of indi-
viduals in California and Washington to elimination of
affirmative action is documented. Eliminating affir-
mative action appears to have resulted in a modest
increase in self-employment among minorities and
Table 8 Linear probability regressions for business ownership: CA sample based on minority share [CPS (1990–2006)]









Demographic controls No Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Minority/female year fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Minority/female CA and WA time trends No No No Yes
Mean of dependent variable 0.0839 0.0839 0.0839 0.0839
Sample size 1,858,112 1,858,112 1,858,112 1,858,112
Displayed are triple-difference coefficients representing the change in the self-employment rate after the elimination of affirmative
action for minorities and women, represented by the treatment variable D, relative to White males in the treatment state versus the 15
states with minority population share most similar to California
The sample consists of individuals (aged 20–64 years)
Demographic controls include age, education, marital status, and urban status
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the state level
Table 9 Linear probability regressions for business ownership: WA sample based on minority share [CPS (1990–2006)]









Demographic controls No Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Minority/female year fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Minority/female CA and WA time trends No No No Yes
Mean of dependent variable 0.0839 0.0839 0.0839 0.0839
Sample size 1,277,061 1,277,061 1,277,061 1,277,061
Displayed are triple-difference coefficients representing the change in the self-employment rate after the elimination of affirmative
action for minorities and women, represented by the treatment variable D, relative to White males in the treatment state versus the 15
states with minority population share most similar to Washington
The sample consists of individuals (aged 20–64 years)
Demographic controls include age, education, marital status, and urban status
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the state level
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women based on our DDD results that include a
comparison group of all states. These results are not
sensitive to the inclusion of controls for race/state time
trends, alternative definitions of self-employment,
restricting the age range of the sample, and allowing
for the possibility of delayed implementation of the
elimination of affirmative action. However, not all of
the results that we present indicate an increase in
minority/female self-employment following elimina-
tion of affirmative action. Most notably, when we
create more similar sets of comparison states for
California and Washington we do not find evidence of
positive effects following removal of affirmative
action. We find very small and statistically insignifi-
cant estimates, and negative estimates in some cases. A
weakening of the overall conclusions also occurs when
we focus the analysis on minority and White men, and
we find some negative estimates for specific race/
gender groups. Although it is difficult to pinpoint the
causes of these divergent results, it leaves open the
possibility that the potentially negative effects of
eliminating affirmative action on public contracting
opportunities outweigh the potentially positive effects
on self-employment through restricted government
employment opportunities for some groups.
The increase in self-employment we document in
some of our specifications may have occurred
because the elimination of broadly based affirmative
action programs reduced the employment opportuni-
ties of minorities and women, forcing them to turn to
self-employment. Previous research indicates large
negative employment effects following the elimina-
tion of affirmative action in California (Myers 2007;
Discrimination Research Center and Equal Rights
Table 10 Linear probability regressions for business ownership: CA sample based on minority share [CPS (1990–2006)]
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
























































Demographic controls No Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Race/gender year fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Race/gender CA time trends No No No Yes
Mean of dependent variable 0.08385 0.08385 0.08385 0.08385
Sample size 1,858,112 1,858,112 1,858,112 1,858,112
Displayed are triple-difference coefficients representing the change in the self-employment rate after the elimination of affirmative
action for minorities and women, represented by the treatment variable D, relative to White males in the treatment state versus the 15
states with minority population share most similar to California
The sample consists of individuals (aged 20–64 years)
Demographic controls include age, education, marital status, and urban status
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the state level
334 R. Fairlie, J. Marion
123
Advocates 2004). Further research on the impacts of
eliminating broader state affirmative action programs
could investigate this channel by distinguishing
between different types of self-employed business
ownership. Elimination of affirmative action in
California and Washington may have resulted in an
increase in low-income self-employment for many
minorities, but it may have also resulted in a decrease
in high-income self-employment for minorities.
Unfortunately, the CPS ORG files do not provide
information on the earnings or number of employees
of self-employed business owners allowing one to
identify potentially divergent patterns. One possibil-
ity for future research is to use confidential and
restricted-access data from the Census Bureau on
minority-owned businesses. The Census Bureau is
working on methods of matching the Survey of
Business Owners (SBO) data which have information
on the race of the owner with longitudinal business-
level data which have information on revenues and
employment.
One limitation of the research design employed is
that it is unable to uncover longer-run effects of
eliminating affirmative action on self-employment.
The businesses owned by individuals drawn into self-
employment as a result of elimination of affirmative
action may have different survival probabilities than
the broader pool of businesses. Furthermore, the lack
of affirmative action may alter investment incentives
for businesses and individuals, thereby affecting
wages of minorities and women and the profitability
of minority- and female-owned firms. These long-run
effects are difficult to sign theoretically, and would be
a challenge to uncover empirically. Although future
research is needed on this important topic, this study
represents the first step towards understanding the
Table 11 Linear probability regressions for business ownership: WA sample based on minority share [CPS (1990–2006)]
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
























































Demographic controls No Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Race/gender year fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Race/gender CA time trends No No No Yes
Mean of dependent variable 0.08387 0.08387 0.08387 0.08387
Sample size 1,277,061 1,277,061 1,277,061 1,277,061
Displayed are triple-difference coefficients representing the change in the self-employment rate after the elimination of affirmative
action for minorities and women, represented by the treatment variable D, relative to White males in the treatment state versus the 15
states with minority population share most similar to Washington
The sample consists of individuals (aged 20–64 years)
Demographic controls include age, education, marital status, and urban status
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the state level
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effects of broadly based affirmative action programs
on minority and female self-employment.
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Appendix 1
See Table 12.
Table 12 Comparison states by minority share of population census 2000
State Total population Minority percent Black percent Latino percent Min. share states
Alabama 4,447,100 29.7 26.0 1.7
Alaska 626,932 32.4 3.5 4.1 CA
Arizona 5,130,632 36.2 3.1 25.3 CA
Arkansas 2,673,400 21.4 15.7 3.2 WA
California 33,871,648 53.3 6.7 32.4 CA
Colorado 4,301,261 25.5 3.8 17.1 WA
Connecticut 3,405,565 22.5 9.1 9.4 WA
Delaware 783,600 27.5 19.2 4.8 WA
District of Columbia 572,059 72.2 60.0 7.9
Florida 15,982,378 34.6 14.6 16.8 CA
Georgia 8,186,453 37.4 28.7 5.3 CA
Hawaii 1,211,537 77.1 1.8 7.2
Idaho 1,293,953 12.0 0.4 7.9
Illinois 12,419,293 32.2 15.1 12.3 CA
Indiana 6,080,485 14.2 8.4 3.5
Iowa 2,926,324 7.4 2.1 2.8
Kansas 2,688,418 16.9 5.7 7.0 WA
Kentucky 4,041,769 10.7 7.3 1.5
Louisiana 4,468,976 37.5 32.5 2.4 CA
Maine 1,274,923 3.5 0.5 0.7
Maryland 5,296,486 37.9 27.9 4.3 CA
Massachusetts 6,349,097 18.1 5.4 6.8 WA
Michigan 9,938,444 21.4 14.2 3.3 WA
Minnesota 4,919,479 11.8 3.5 2.9
Mississippi 2,844,658 39.3 36.3 1.4 CA
Missouri 5,595,211 16.2 11.2 2.1 WA
Montana 902,195 10.5 0.3 2.0
Nebraska 1,711,263 12.7 4.0 5.5
Nevada 1,998,257 34.8 6.8 19.7 CA
New Hampshire 1,235,786 4.9 0.7 1.7
New Jersey 8,414,350 34.0 13.6 13.3 CA
New Mexico 1,819,046 55.3 1.9 42.1 CA
New York 18,976,457 38.0 15.9 15.1 CA
North Carolina 8,049,313 29.8 21.6 4.7
North Dakota 642,200 8.3 0.6 1.2
Ohio 11,353,140 16.0 11.5 1.9 WA




Table 13 Means of
analysis variables: CPS
(1990–2006)




Self-employment rate 8.4% 9.2% 9.3%
Age (years) 39.9 39.2 40.0
Age squared/100 17.4 16.8 17.4
High-school graduate 33.5% 25.1% 29.9%
Some college 27.5% 29.9% 33.8%
College graduate 25.1% 26.5% 27.6%
Married 59.8% 56.8% 60.1%
Previously married 16.4% 16.3% 17.6%
Non-central city 41.0% 52.8% 40.6%
Rural 18.4% 2.0% 17.9%
Not identified central city status 15.8% 7.7% 20.0%
Male Black 5.4% 3.0% 1.5%
Male Latino 5.6% 14.6% 2.5%
Male other minority 2.4% 6.3% 3.8%
Female White 36.5% 26.1% 42.5%
Female Black 6.6% 3.4% 1.4%
Female Latino 5.3% 13.7% 2.2%
Female other minority 2.6% 6.9% 4.3%
Sample size 4,267,176 335,955 60,814
Table 12 continued
State Total population Minority percent Black percent Latino percent Min. share states
Oklahoma 3,450,654 25.9 7.6 5.2 WA
Oregon 3,421,399 16.5 1.6 8.0 WA
Pennsylvania 12,281,054 15.9 10.0 3.2 WA
Rhode Island 1,048,319 18.1 4.5 8.7 WA
South Carolina 4,012,012 33.9 29.5 2.4 CA
South Dakota 754,844 12.0 0.6 1.4
Tennessee 5,689,283 20.8 16.4 2.2 WA
Texas 20,851,820 47.6 11.5 32.0 CA
Utah 2,233,169 14.7 0.8 9.0 WA
Vermont 608,827 3.8 0.5 0.9
Virginia 7,078,515 29.8 19.6 4.7 CA
Washington 5,894,121 21.1 3.2 7.5 WA
West Virginia 1,808,344 5.4 3.2 0.7
Wisconsin 5,363,675 12.7 5.7 3.6
Wyoming 493,782 11.1 0.8 6.4
Estimates of minority share of the total population are from the 2000 Census
See text for more details on selection of minority share and affirmative action program comparison states for California and
Washington
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